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The Attorney Client Privilege
Under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938:
Attorney General v. Covington and Burling
The Foreign Agents Registration Act of 19381 was enacted to protect
the interests of the United States by requiring complete disclosure by
persons acting on behalf of foreign principals and whose activities are
political in nature. 2 Since the Act's inception, several questions have
been raised concerning the duties of attorneys who are duly registered
under the Act and who represent foreign principals. 3 In Attorney General
v. Covington and Burling,4 a court dealt for the first time with the attorney
client privilege and the Act. The district court for the District of Colum-
bia held that the attorney client privilege was inherently contained
within provisions of the Act, and was therefore applicable to attorneys
registered under the Act who represent foreign principals. A year later,
the court handed down a memorandum opinion, Attorney General v.
Covington and Burling, 5 outlining the scope and extent of the privilege
where the attorney representing a foreign principal is asked to divulge
confidential communications from his foreign client. The cases illustrate
the inherent conflict between the disclosure provisions of the Act, the
national interests the Act was intended to protect and the benefits
gained by the attorney client privilege. Covington 1977 set forth
guidelines for the application of the privilege in situations where it
conflicts with the Act's disclosure provisions. An analysis of these
guidelines and their practical impact upon attorneys representing
foreign principals is the focus of this note.
In 1967, Covington and Burling [hereinafter C&B], a large
Washington law firm, registered as an agent of the Republic of Guinea. 6
The firm's main activities for Guinea involved a project to develop the
country's bauxite resources. C&B engaged in negotiations with U.S. and
foreign corporations to mine the bauxite, and helped negotiate loans for
the project from various international lending agencies. 7 In addition,
1 22 U.S.C. §§ 611-621 (1970) [hereinafter the Act].
2 H.R. REP. No. 1470,89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2(1966), reprinted in [1966] U.S. CODE CONG. &
NEws 2397.
3 The first is when attorneys representing foreign principals must register under the
Act. See notes 48, 49 and 71-74 infra and accompanying text for a discussion of this as it
relates to this note. A second involves the records attorneys who register must keep. This
is answered by dicta in the note case. See notes 50-52 and 70 infra and accompanying text.
4 411 F. Supp. 371 (D.D.C. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Covington 1976].
5 430 F. Supp. 1117 (D.D.C. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Covington 1977].
6 411 F. Supp. at 372.
7 Id.
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C&B hired consultants to prepare negotiating positions for Guinea. 8
C&B also represented Guinea in a number of smaller matters. 9
In January 1975, officials of the Registration Unit of the Justice De-
partment (acting as the Attorney General's agents) sought to inspect the
records C&B maintained with respect to Guinea. The firm turned over
approximately ninety-five percent of the records requested, but refused
to allow the government to inspect the remaining five percent, amount-
ing to one thousand pages. 10 C&B claimed these documents were confi-
dential communications between Guinea and the firm regarding legal
matters, and were protected from disclosure by the attorney client
privilege. The Attorney General then filed suit seeking a mandatory
injunction ordering C&B to allow the Registration Unit to examine the
documents." The court in Covington 1976 held that an attorney who has
registered under the Act and who represents a foreign principal may
validly claim the attorney client privilege to prevent disclosure of any
documents required to be kept under the Act. The court then said it
would determine by an in camera inspection whether such documents
were within the scope of the privilege. 12 C&B turned the documents
over to Judge Sirica, the presiding judge, who became concerned that
C&B might have been claiming more than it was entitled to claim under
the privilege as traditionally defined. He asked the parties to submit
additional memoranda on this point. 13
In Covington 1977, the court stated that it was "imperative that the
privilege recognized be narrowly limited within its traditional con-
fines," 14 and set forth the following guidelines in determining whether a
document was covered by the privilege: (1) the privilege was upheld for
communications from the client to the attorney and the attorney's
agents where C&B alleged disclosure would tend to reveal the client's
8 430 F. Supp. at 1121. The largest consultant was the accounting firm Price
Waterhouse, which prepared a negotiating position for taxation of the corporation that
developed the bauxite.
9 411 F. Supp. at 372. Among others, a contract claim arising from bauxite transac-
tions, and a contract dispute arising out of Guinea's exhibit at the New York World's Fair
in 1964.
10 Id.
11 The authority for the Attorney General to seek an injunction is in 22 U.S.C. § 618(f)
(1970), which reads in part:
Whenever in the judgment of the Attorney General ... any agent of a foreign
principal fails to comply with any of the provisions of this Act or the regula-
tions issued thereunder, or otherwise is in violation of the Act, the Attorney
General may make application to the appropriate United States district court
for an order ... requiring compliance with any appropriate provision of the
Act or regulation thereunder. The district court shall ... issue a temporary or
permanent injunction, restraining order or such other order which it may
deem proper.
12 411 F. Supp. at 377.
13 430 F. Supp. at 1119.
14 Id. at 1120.
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confidence specifically;1 5 (2) the privilege was granted for communica-
tions from the client's agents only to the extent disclosure tended to
reveal a confidence from the client to an agent or to the attorney; 16 (3)
the privilege was not upheld with respect to communications only
tangentially related to legal matters; 17 and (4) the court allowed the
privilege to prevent disclosure in all instances where C&B was unsure of
a document's confidentiality, except where the document (a) might be of
interest to the Attorney General under the Act, (b) contained informa-
tion likely to be disclosed to third persons in the future, or (c) could have
been definitely classified as confidential or not by the attorney through
information from other sources.1 8 Following these guidelines, Judge
Sirica found that "none of the documents held privileged would, if
disclosed, add measurably to the Registration Unit's knowledge of the
activities of C&B on behalf of Guinea."' 9
In addition, the court rejected a proposal by the Registration Unit
that it be allowed to view all documents turned over to the court under a
protective order forbidding disclosure. If the Unit found information it
felt should or must be disclosed under the Act, it would ask the court for
a specific determination of whether and to what extent that particular
information might be privileged. While recognizing the advantages of
the Unit's expertise, Judge Sirica rejected the proposal. 20
The attorney client privilege rests upon the rationale that it provides
certain "benefits to justice." "In order to promote freedom of consulta-
tion of legal advisors by clients, the apprehension of compelled disclo-
sure by the legal advisors must be removed; hence the law must prohibit
such disclosure except on the client's consent." 21 Today, according to
Fisher v. United States, 22 "confidential disclosures by a client to an attor-
ney made in order to obtain legal assistance are privileged." 23 It is felt
that full disclosure by the client to his attorney will promote the ad-
ministration of justice in an adversary system.24
:5 Id. at 1120-22.
6 Id. at 1121.
17 Id. at 1121-22.
18 Id. at 1122.
19 Id.
20 Id. at 1119, 1120.
21 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2291 (McNaughten rev. ed. 1961) at 545 [hereinafter cited as
8 WIGMORE]. See also MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 187 (2d ed. E. Cleary ed. 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK].
22 425 U.S. 391 (1976).
23 Id. at 403-04. Wigmore defines the privilege as follows:
(1) Where legal advice of any kind is sought (2) from a professional legal
advisor in his capacity as such, (3) the communications relating to that pur-
pose, (4) made in confidence (5) by the client, (6) are at his insistence perma-
nently protected (7) from disclosure by himself or by the legal advisor, (8)
except the protection be waived. 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 554.
24 For a thorough discussion of this, see 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2291 and
MCCORMICK, supra note 21, § 87.
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The privilege has been criticized for obstructing justice by restricting
access to pertinent facts, and for encouraging unfounded litigation
based on partial disclosure of facts. 25 For these reasons, recent case law
has confined the attorney client privilege to the narrowest possible limits
consistent with its purpose of allowing the client to place full and unre-
stricted confidence in his attorney. In the recent Fisher decision, the Su-
preme Court held that "the privilege applies only where necessary to
achieve its purpose. Accordingly, it protects only those disclosures
necessary to obtain informed legal advice which might not have been
made absent the privilege." '26
In applying the privilege, courts distinguish between the attorney's
acting as a lawyer, i.e., giving predominately legal advice, applying rules
of law and preparing cases for litigation and prosecuting appeals, 27 and
his acting in any other capacity. 28 Thus the privilege has not been
applied to communications connected with transactions where the at-
torney has acted as a business agent or advisor, 29 as a negotiator, 30 as a
banker, 3 1 as an accountant, 32 or in providing ministerial, clerical and
25 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2291 and MCCORMiCK, supra note 21, at 176-77.
If one were legislating for a new commonwealth, without history or customs,
it might be hard to maintain that a privilege for lawyer client communications
would facilitate more than it would obstruct the administration of justice ...
[but] confined as we are by this 'cake of custom,' it is unlikely that enough
energy could not be generated to abolish the privilege. Id. at 176.
26 Id. at 403.
27 Zenith Radio Corp. v. Radio Corp. of America, 121 F. Supp. 792, 794 (D. Del. 1953).
28 See 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2296. As a practical matter, Wigmore states:
Where the general purpose concerns legal rights and obligations, a particular
incidental transaction would receive protection though in itself it was merely
commercial in nature .... And the privilege of nondisclosure is not lost
merely because relevant non-legal considerations are expressly stated in a
communication which also includes legal advice. Id. at 567.
See United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 357 (D. Mass. 1950) (where
one part of a conversation was confidential and the rest not, the entire was protected).
29 4 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.60(2) (2d ed. 1976). See United States v. Vehicular
Parking Ltd., 52 F. Supp. 751 (D. Del. 1943) (business advice and direction by an attorney
who was promoter, director, and manager of the corporation in antitrust litigation were not
privileged); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp. 347 (D. Mass. 1950)
(communications seeking business or personal advice are not privileged); In re Grand Jury
Subpoena Duces Tecum, 391 F. Supp. 1029 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) (business advice from an
attorney not privileged); Georgia Plywood Co. v. United States Plywood Corp., 18 F.R.D.
463 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (communications of patent advice and technical knowledge not held
privileged); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314 (7th Cir. 1963).
30 See Myles E. Reiser Co. v. Loew's, Inc., 81 N.Y.S.2d 861 (1948) (information ob-
tained by attorneys for clients in negotiations as negotiators was not privileged); Banks v.
United States, 204 F.2d 666 (8th Cir. 1953) (communications to an attorney acting in the
capacity of negotiator with an IRS officer held not privileged); Radio Corp. of America v.
Rauland Corp., 18 F.R.D. 440 (N.D. Ill. 1955) (negotiations between different corporations
conducted by attorneys are not protected by the privilege).
31 See Belcher v. Sommerville, 413 S.W.2d 620 (Ky. 1967) (conversations with
attorney/banker contacted as a banker were not privileged).
32 See In re Fisher, 51 F.2d 424 (S.D.N.Y. 1931) (information given to an attorney for
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drafting services without legal advice. 33 The privilege has not been
extended to uphold the confidentiality of documents which are intended
to be communicated to third parties, 34 or which do not reveal confiden-
tial information. 35
The burden of showing the elements of the privilege with respect to
each communication rests with the invoking party. Wigmore states with
regard to the elements:
1) The communications must originate in a confidence that they
will not be disclosed.
2) This element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and
satisfactory maintenance of the relations between the parties.
3) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the com-
munity ought to be sedulously fostered.
4) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure
of the communications must begreater than the benefit thereby
gained for the correct disposal of the litigation.
Only if these four conditions are present should a privilege be
recognized.36
Accordingly, the attorney or client must show that the communications
were given in confidence to an attorney acting in his capacity as legal
advisor and were given for the purpose of obtaining legal advice from
him.
Whereas the attorney client privilege is intended to preserve confi-
dentiality by restricting disclosure, the Foreign Agents Registration Act
of 1938 destroys confidentiality by requiring complete disclosure. The
Act has been amended seven times, 37 and its focus has shifted from
the purpose of making a financial statement was not privileged); United States v. Chin Lim
Mow, 12 F.R.D. 533 (N.D. Cal. 1952) (where attorney acts solely as an accountant, informa-
tion communicated for that purpsoe is not privileged); Oleander v. United States, 210 F.2d
795 (9th Cir. 1954) (communications to attorney/accountant for accounting purposes are
not privileged in a tax evasion suit).
33 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 570. See also Canady v. United States, 354 F.2d 849 (8th
Cir. 1966) (no privilege where attorney merely prepared a tax return without giving legal
advice or service); Pollock v. United States, 202 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1953) (uncomplicated real
estate transactions do not qualify for protection of the privilege); United States v. Bartone,
400 F.2d 459 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027 (1968) (information disclosed by an
attorney tracing funds to and from various corporations and his client held not privileged).
34 See United States v. Johnson, 465 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1972) (privilege not applicable to
documents of the type designed to be disclosed to third parties); United States v. Int'l
Business Machs. Corp., 66 F.R.D. 206, 215 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
35 See McCoRmicK, supra note 21, at 91; United States v. Int'l Business Machs. Corp.,
66 F.R.D. 206, 214 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 89 F. Supp.
357 (D. Mass. 1950) (privilege not applied to information coming from sources outside the
client corporation, or to information obtained from conferences held in the presence of
outsiders).
36 8 WIGMORE, supra note 21 at 527.
37 In 1939, 1942, 1950, 1956, 1961, 1966, and 1970. 22 U.S.C. § 611-621 (1972).
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curbing "subversive and marginally subversive activity"3 to providing
"the public with information about foreign agency relationships. ' 39 The
Act requires every "agent of a foreign principal" to file a registration
statement with the Attorney General. 4 0 This statement must include all
activities undertaken on behalf of the principal. 41 A copy of any "politi-
cal propaganda" the agent publicizes on the principal's behalf must also
be disclosed.42 All "books of account and other records with respect to
all his activities" on behalf of the foreign principal must be preserved
and disclosed upon demand. 43 The Attorney General must in turn make
such records available to the public and interested parties in the gov-
ernment. 44 Penalties for non-disclosure or non-registration are up to a
$10,000 fine and/or five years in prision.45 The Attorney General may
also request a mandatory injunction to force disclosures, 46 and may
require disclosure of any information deemed necessary to accomplish
the purpose of the Act. 47
Two important exemptions from registration are set forth in section
613. Section 613(d) exempts "[a]ny person engaging or agreeing to en-
gage only (1) in private or non-political activities in furtherance of the
bona fide trade or commerce of such a foreign principal; or (2) in other
activities not serving predominantly a foreign interest .... "48 Section
613(g) exempts:
Any person qualified to practice law, insofar as he engages or agrees
to engage in the legal representation of a disclosed foreign principal
before any court of law or any agency of the Government of the
United States; provided, that for the purpose of this subsection legal
38 Note, Attorneys under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, 78 HARv. L. REv. 619,
620 (1965).
39 Id. at 620-21.
40 22 U.S.C. § 611 (1970). The term "foreign principal" includes foreign governments,
foreign political parties, all persons outside the United States, and all combinations of
persons or corporations organized under foreign law or having their principal place of
business in a foreign nation. Id. § 611(b). "Agent of a foreign principal" includes "any
person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant," or any person who
acts "at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign principal," and i)
engages in political activities on behalf of the principal, ii) acts as "a public relations
counsel, publicity agent, information-service employee, or political consultant" on behalf
of the principal, iii) within the United States solicits or disburses funds, loans, or contribu-
tions for the principal, iv) represents the interests of a foreign principal before an agency or
official of the United States Government in the United States. Id. § 611(c).
41 Id. § 612. Agents must also disclose fully the purposes and terms of their contract
with the principal, all records of receipts pursuant to the contract, the names of those
assisting in the activities which require disclosure, and all personal activities on behalf of
the foreign principal.
42 Id. § 614.
43 Id. § 615.
44 Id. § 616.
45 Id. § 618.
46 Id. See note 11 supra.
47 Id. § 620.
48 Id. § 613(d).
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representation does not include attempts to influence or persuade
agency personnel or officials other than in the course of established
agency proceedings, whether formal or informal. 49
Judge Sirica in Covington 1976 ruled that the section 613(g) exemp-
tion, where applicable, does not include all communications tradition-
ally protected by the attorney client privilege.5 0 He read section 613(d) to
require "an attorney who engages in any non-exempt activities on be-
half of a foreign principal... must include in his registration statement a
description of the otherwise exempt legal activities .... ,51 In effect, if the
attorney registers, some confidential communications might be included
in the books and records he is required to keep and hence would be
subject to disclosure. Judge Sirica deemed the attorney client privilege
the wisest way to protect against this.
5 2
The guidelines set forth in Covington 1977 for the most part apply
the attorney client privilege inherently contained in the Act within the
narrow limits set forth in Fisher. By restricting the privilege for com-
munications from the client and its agents to that information which
tended to reveal a confidence specifically,5 3 and by not granting the
49 Id. § 613(g). Prior to 1966, § 613(d) exempted "any person engaging or agreeing to
engage only in private and nonpolitical financial or mercantile activities in furtherance of
the bona fide trade or commerce of such foreign principal ... " in 1964, the Supreme Court
in Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964), interpreted the "nonpolitical financial or
mercantile activities" exemption to be unavailable to an attorney representing Cuba in
allegedly financial and mercantile matters. In 1966, Congress noted that the decision in
Rabinowitz "caused some uncertainty as to whether a foreign government could ever act in
a private capacity within the meaning of the commercial exemption." H.R. REP. No. 1470,
supra note 2, at 2405. In the amendments and additions to § 613, the House Judiciary
Committee desired to broaden the exemption to include "all private and non-political
activities with a bona fide commercial purpose" and further stated that "attorneys at law
are not required to register because they engage in legal representations of foreign princi-
pals whose identity they disclose." Id. at 2398.
For an in-depth criticism of Rabinowitz and its effect on the Act prior to the 1966
amendments, see Note, Attorneys under the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, supra note
38.
so Judge Sirica noted that the "privilege extends to all communications where legal
advice of any kind is sought, whether made in contemplation of litigation or not." 411 F.
Supp. at 374. On its face, § 613(g) exempts only legal representation before a court or
agency of the Government. See note 49, supra and accompanying text.
51 411 F. Supp. at 374.
52 Without the privilege, two situations arise where confidential communications
might be disclosed. (1) The Registration Unit may be forced by § 616(c) of the Act to
disclose all information it receives. That section states: "The Attorney General is au-
thorized to furnish to departments and agencies in the executive branch and committees of
the Congress such information obtained by him in the administration of this [Act]... as
may be appropriate in the light of this [Act]." (2) The Freedom of Information Act, 5
U.S.C. § 552 (1970) as amended (Supp. V, 1975), may require disclosure of any records the
Unit obtains: "[s]uch documents could conceivably be considered 'records' under
§ 552(a)(3), and might not fall within one of the specific exemptions from disclosure of
§ 552(b)." 430 F. Supp. at 1120. Also, there is no protection against the documents being
leaked, except by protective order, which the court recognized would not satisfy a foreign
client unfamiliar with the American system of justice. The Registration Unit's suggested
procedure was rejected for this reason. Id.
53 See notes 28, 34 and 35 supra and accompanying text.
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privilege to communications only tangentially related to legal matters,5 4
the court adhered to the spirit of Fisher and recent case law.
Only where the court allowed the privilege to protect documents
whose confidentiality C&B was unsure of did the court extend the
privilege beyond the narrow bounds of recent case law. The most C&B
could allege in good faith for the documents was " [w]e cannot deter-
mine that this [document] does not disclose a confidential communica-
tion from [Guinea] to the firm." 5 5 The court reasoned "that Guinea may
not have understood how the American legal system works, and for that
reason ... not cooperated fully with C&B." 56 By giving the attorney
some leeway in this situation, 57 the guidelines recognize that "where a
country is involved, a somewhat broader rule might apply." 58
This broader rule permits the attorney to invoke the privilege for
communications for which he cannot allege the element of confidentiality
necessary to the privilege.5 9 Requiring the attorney to show the ele-
ments of the privilege is necessary to guard against the attorney's
naming as agents all persons with whom he has contact, thereby
protecting all communications with such person. 60 Though this
application of the privilege is limited to the representation of foreign
nations where the client has not cooperated fully with the attorney, it is
an expansion of the privilege.
This expansion can be criticized on national security grounds. It has
been held consistently in cases of foreign policy and national security
that traditional rights and privileges may be subordinated where "there
is strong governmental interest supporting the disclosures sought .... ,61
In Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid Committee, 62 the district court
held that the foreign agent must divulge membership information even
though such information is usually protected by the first amendment. 63
The court stated that "[the governmental interest may fairly be said to
outweigh any possible infringement of first amendment rights of the
54 See notes 27-33 supra and accompanying text.
55 430 F. Supp. at 1122.
56 Id.
57 See note 18 supra and accompanying text for exceptions to this application.
58 430 F. Supp. at 1122.
-9 See note 33 supra and accompanying text. Judge Sirica himself recognized that it is
not sufficient for the attorney "simply to allege with respect to a particular document that
each element of the privilege was, and continues to be, present. The attorney also has the
burden of showing with sufficient certainty that the elements do, in fact, exist." 430 F.
Supp. at 1122.60 See Burlington Indus. v. Exxon Corp., 65 F.R.D. 26 (D. Md. 1974).
61 Attorney Gen. v. Irish Northern Aid Comm., 346 F. Supp. 1384, 1390 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). The basis for the strong governmental interest is the "indisputable power of the
Government to conduct its foreign relations and to provide for the national defenseId.
62 Id.
63 Forced disclosure under the Act was held constitutional in United States v. Peace
Information Center, 97 F. Supp. 255 (D.D.C. 1951).
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defendant's members or contributors." 64 Against this background, any
existing attorney client privilege that is inconsistent with the Act might
be challenged, and as a matter of national security, there is no basis for
applying a broader rule to foreign countries.
The broader rule for foreign nations that do not fully cooperate is
contradicted by Judge Sirica's own statement that, given the unusual way
the issue arose, "it is imperative that the privilege recognized be nar-
rowly limited within its traditional confines." 65 However, it is doubtful
whether the broader rule or the privilege itself as applied to foreign
nations will have any practical effect upon the national security. As
noted earlier, an exception to the expanded rule disallows the privilege
where the communication might be of interest to the Attorney General
in fulfilling his obligations under the Act. The basis of the national
security argument against a broader privilege reflects a fear that the
court's in camera judgment in balancing the national security and dis-
closure needs against the benefits obtained by the privilege will allow
relevent information under the Act to be withheld from the Attorney
General. However, there is no reason to believe that the Attorney Gen-
eral's need will be weighed any less against the privilege than it was
against a constitutional right in Attorney General v. Irish Northern Aid
Committee. 66 In subjecting communications to an in camera inspection,
Judge Sirica stated that "[t]he court believes that in all or nearly all
instances an impartial judicial officer would be able to disclose portions
of a confidential document, or the substance of it, relevant to the Attor-
ney General's needs under the Act without compromising the attorney
client relationship. ", 67
The decisions in the Covington cases will have a practical impact
upon the status of attorneys representing foreign clients under the Act
that extends beyond the guidelines set for thi attorney client privilege.
The interpretation of sections 613 (d) and (g), which require record keep-
ing and possible disclosure of all the attorney's activities on behalf of the
foreign principal, have clarified which records an attorney registered
under the Act must preserve. 68 The question of when an attorney must
64 346 F. Supp. at 1391.
65 430 F. Supp. at 1120.
66 See note 64 supra and accompanying text regarding the weight of governmental
interest.
67 411 F. Supp. at 376-77.
68 22 U.S.C. § 613 (1970). A regulation by the Attorney General now requires an agent
who registers to keep "[a]ll correspondence, memoranda, cables, telegrams, teletype mes-
sages, and other written communications to and from all foreign principals and all other
persons relating to the registrant's activities on behalf of or in the interest of any of his
foreign principals." 28 C.F.R. § 5.500(a)(1) (1976). Although the interpretation of § 613(d)
and (g) in Covington 1976 (see notes 48-51 supra and accompanying text) was dicta, it is the
first judicial interpretation of the records an attorney registered under the Act must keep.
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register under the Act was not litigated in Covington.69 The added
protection against disclosure provided to the client by the attorney client
privilege, appended to the penalties for non-registration,70 may cause
prudent attorneys to register under the Act out of caution.71 It is more
likely that attorneys representing foreign principals in situations similar
to that of C&B may not register, and risk the penalties in order to avoid
the expense and inconvenience of litigation. If this latter possibility
prevails, the intent of Congress concerning the registration of attorneys
under the Act may be fulfilled;72 however, this issue has not been
decided definitely. 73
The guidelines in Covington 1977 have provided a practical basis for
resolving the tension between the national interests protected in the Act
69 According to the court in Covington 1976, C&B registered under the Act out of an
abundance of caution and alleged it was not subject to it at all, but agreed for purposes of
argument to assume this contention failed. 411 F. Supp. at 372-73 n.l.
70 Up to $10,000 fine and/or five years in jail. 22 U.S.C. § 618 (1970).
71 See note 71 supra.
72 The registration issue is tangential to Covington, but practically important because to
reach the issue decided in Covington, the attorney must first have registered under the Act.
The intent of Congress is seen in the following from H.R. REP. No. 1470, supra note 2:
A specific exemption for attorneys for representation of foreign clients in the
courts and before administrative agencies is contained in [section 613 (g)], but
the day-to-day, routine activities of attorneys in advising and counseling
with foreign clients will continue to be exempt under this section. When
advice is given or assistance is rendered with the intent to influence Gov-
ernment policy, the agent is engaged in a political activity and the exemption
will not apply. Id. at 2405.
[Section 613(g) was intended to allow attorneys an exemption] broad enough to
cover legal representation even when the proceedings or the activities involved
are informal .... The test of the exemption would be legal representation. An
attorney would still be precluded from using the case or proceeding as a vehicle
for generating propaganda for his principal. If the attorney's activities outside
the court room or hearing room go beyond the bounds of normal legal
representation of his client's case and amount to efforts to influence public
opinion, his activities become political activities and the exemption does not
apply. Id. at 2408.
The Attorney General's regulations pursuant to the § 613(g) lawyer's exemption indicate:
(a) Attempts to influence or persuade agency personnel or officials other than
in the course of established agency proceedings, whether formal or infor-
mal, shall include only such attempts to influence or persuade with reference
to formulating, adopting, or changing the domestic or foreign policies of the
United States or with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or
relations of a government of a foreign country or a foreign political party ....
28 C.F.R. § 5.306(a) (1976).
Nothing in the case indicates C&B attempted to influence public opinion on behalf of
Guinea. Litigation concerning registration of an attorney in the situation of C&B would
clarify the registration issue.
73 The issue was litigated in Rabinowitz v. Kennedy, 376 U.S. 605 (1964); however, the
subsequent amendment of section 613(d) and addition of section 613(g) to the Act indi-
cated Congress' dissatisfaction with the Rabinowitz holding, as it "caused some uncertainty
as to whether a foreign government could ever act in a private capacity within the meaning
of the commercial exemption." H.R. REP. No. 1470, supra note 2, at 2405. The issue has not
been litigated since the amendments.
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and the benefits to justice provided by the attorney client privilege. Both
decisions in Covington clarify the duties of attorneys registered under the
Act. If future litigation indicates attorneys in the position of C&B need
not register, the Covington cases will not be as significant as they would
be if attorneys are required to register. Unless future decisions hold
that attorneys representing foreign principals need not register,
the Covington cases will continue to be useful for the guidelines they
enunciate.
- STUART OLIVER BAESEL, JR.

